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Abstract: 
Philosophers and psychologists often claim that moral agency is connected with the ability to feel, understand, and deploy 
moral emotions. In this chapter, I investigate the nature of these emotions and their connection with moral agency. First, I 
examine the degree to which these emotional capacities are innate and/or ‘basic’ in a philosophically important sense. I 
examine three senses in which an emotion might be basic: developmental, compositional, and phylogenetic. After 
considering the evidence for basic emotion, I conclude that emotions are not basic in a philosophically important sense. 
Emotions, I argue, are best understood as socially constructed concepts. I then investigate whether these emotions are 
necessary for moral agency. In order to do this I examine the philosophical and psychological literature on psychopathy and 
autism (two conditions defined in terms of empathic and emotional deficits). Persons with psychopathy appear incapable 
of distinguishing moral from non-moral norms. Additionally, while persons with autism often struggle to develop their 
empathic capacities, they are capable of understanding and deploying moral emotions like guilt and shame. I conclude that, 
in line with the conceptual act theories of emotion, that only contagion-based empathy is necessary for the acquisition of 
moral concepts.  
 
Erick Jose Ramirez 
Santa Clara University 
 
Few human experiences are as universal as emotional experience. Or so it is thought. There are, to be 
sure, cross-cultural differences in emotional ​concepts​. For example, the emotional life of the Ifaluk 
people, who all live on a few small islands within the Federated States of Micronesia, is dominated by 
four emotions: song, fago, ker, and metagu/rus. Although these emotional concepts are often 
translated as justified indignation, compassion-love-sadness, happiness-ecstasy-joy, and 
fear-panic-surprise-anxiety respectively, many wonder whether these translations do justice to the 
Ifaluk emotional life (Cardoso 2015). Although few scholars dispute the existence of cultural variation 
across emotional concepts, many believe that this variation masks an underlying unity of emotional 
experience​.  
In this chapter I provide a critical examination of what are called “basic” emotions. 
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Philosophers and psychologists have long believed that human beings, with few exceptions, are born 
with the capability of feeling and expressing a small but important set of emotions. Although 
happiness, sadness, disgust, surprise, fear, and anger are often the prime suspects on a list of basic 
emotions, the exact names and number of these emotions varies widely from as few as two to as many 
as a eighteen (Ortony & Turner 1990).  
I begin by explaining the allure that basic emotions have held for psychologists and, especially, 
for philosophers. Sentimentalism, the view that moral values are at least partially constituted by 
emotional content, lies at the heart of this allure. I will survey which, among several, senses of “basic” 
philosophers have traditionally been interested in when they search for basic emotions before I shift 
my attention to the empirical evidence for and against the existence of these emotions. I will conclude 
that the best available evidence actually points us away from basic emotions and toward a conceptual 
act model of emotional concepts. If our interest in emotion is grounded in our interest to understand 
moral psychology, I argue that we can learn a lot about the role of emotion in moral psychology by 
examining the moral concepts of psychopaths and high functioning persons with autism. Both 
psychopathy and autism are typically characterized in terms of empathic deficits. However, the 
empathic deficits associated with each condition are quite distinct. While individuals diagnosed with 
psychopathy routinely struggle to acquire moral concepts, high functioning persons with autism do 
not. I conclude by suggesting the psychopath's lack of moral concepts is best understood as a result of 
their lack of empathic contagion and is exactly what a conceptual act model of emotion would predict.
 Sentimentalist moral psychology, I claim, is enriched by incorporating these findings into their 1
1 Throughout this essay, I make reference to “psychopaths.” Human beings are neurodiverse, meaning that human 
beings experience and cognize the world and human social concepts in diverse ways. In using the term psychopathy, 
I intend to describe a class of persons diagnosed with a very specific set of character traits (elaborated in section V 
of this chapter). I do not intend to license any normative judgements about the status, standing, or value of such 
persons.  
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normative frameworks.  
 
I. The Allure of Basic Emotions 
Aside from those with purely theoretical interests, why might we care about whether our emotions are 
basic (in some sense) or not? One answer comes to us courtesy of early modern philosopher David 
Hume. Hume argued that our emotions, not our reasons, are responsible for our moral and aesthetic 
values (Hume 1740/2002). When we judge that something is beautiful or ugly, right or wrong, just or 
unjust, what we are doing, Hume claimed, is projecting our emotional states onto the external world. 
To better understand the evaluative world, Hume argued, we must better understand our emotional 
lives. Hume is not alone in sensing this connection between how we ​feel​ about something and our 
value ​judgments​ about it. Sentimentalist philosophers believe that this observation represents a deep 
truth about the nature of morality.  
Basic emotions are especially interesting to philosophers trying to make sense of the link 
between emotion and value. Sentimentalist philosophers turn to basic emotions to explain two 
seemingly essential features of morality. First, it seems true for most of us that moral judgments are not 
passive experiences. To judge that something is wrong is to feel some kind of motivation to ​do 
something​ about our judgments. If moral judgments were purely about what we ​think​, this feature of 
our moral judgments would be harder to explain. Picture someone who believes that humans are 
causally responsible for global climate change. Assume further that this person does not think that that 
it’s ​wrong ​for humans to cause global climate change. Would we be surprised if such a person fails to 
do anything about climate change? Probably not. Now picture someone who believes that 
anthropogenic climate change represents an injustice both to future generations and to the globe’s 
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poorest people. It would seem odd if someone who sincerely judged it wrong to contribute to climate 
change did nothing or, worse, increased her carbon footprint. Sincere moral judgments, in other 
words, seem to be at least weakly motivating. We can make sense of this fact, assuming it is a fact, if our 
sincere moral judgments were emotionally laden. Emotions are intrinsically motivating in the sense 
that feeling an emotion brings with it an impulse to act.  
Second, emotions appear to lie at the bottom of many moral and aesthetic disagreements. In a 
series of studies, psychologist Jonathan Haidt asked subjects whether certain actions were wrong. 
These included instances of harmless but clearly aberrant behavior. For example, Haidt included cases 
where subjects used an American flag to clean a toilet or in which a family decides to eat their recently 
deceased dog instead of burying it (Haidt, Helena Koller, & Dias 1993). In another study, Haidt asked 
his subject to determine whether or not it would be wrong for two siblings to engage in a consensual 
incestual relationship (Haidt 2001). As a result of a phenomenon now referred to as “moral 
dumbfounding,” Haidt concluded that his subjects grounded their judgments about the moral 
permissibility of an act based not on good reasons but instead on how those acts made them ​feel​. For 
example, Haidt found that his subjects continued to say that consensual incest was wrong even when 
he concocted cases in which all of the reasons they gave to justify their judgments no longer applied.  2
“Moral dumbfounding” remains a controversial thesis about evaluative judgment (Jacobson 2013). 
However, sentimentalist philosophers see it as powerful evidence in favor of their position. To these 
philosophers, emotions appear to play a fundamental role in our moral judgments and moral practices. 
If our moral judgments are, in fact, grounded on emotion, then the allure of basic emotions is 
2 The most common reasons given against incest included the risk of birth defects and a concern over possible abuse. 
In one version of Haidt’s incest case, for example, the siblings met only as adults, did not have a history of abusive 
relationships, highly enjoyed the experience, and agreed to be sterilized before sexual contact. In such cases, 
subjects continued to judge that the act was wrong. When pressed for a reason, many claimed that incest was simply 
disgusting. 
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easier to understand. Basic emotions offer a solution to a problem that many philosophers believe 
must be explained by any adequate moral theory: the problem of disagreement. It is a truism to claim 
that people disagree about values. It is harder to explain what these disagreements say about the nature 
of morality. 
Disagreements, for example, occur both within a culture and between cultures. Whether 
abortion ought to be permissible, for example, continues to be the subject of intense disagreement 
within and between cultures. Although many disagreements might be explained by the fact that one, 
or both, parties to the disagreement have imperfect or incorrect information, it seems possible that 
equally well-informed persons can disagree about what goodness consists in or whether a particular 
action is morally justifiable. Although many philosophers confront moral disagreement by embracing 
moral relativism (the view that moral claims are limited in their scope or application), sentimentalists 
hoping for a more objective response to the problem of moral disagreement have turned to basic 
emotions for help.  
The idea is that a shared response, or sentiment, somehow moors us in a common subject 
matter, making it possible for us to disagree substantively about what a thing has to be like in 
order to be such that we should feel this sentiment toward it. Thus, if the sentimentalist is 
right, it is because our evaluative concepts have a special tie to shared human sentiments that 
we are able to engage meaningfully in debates over their application. (D'Arms 2005, 13) 
 
If evaluative judgments are anchored by our emotional responses and at least some of those emotional 
responses are basic then moral disagreements can be understood as disagreements about the conditions 
under which a particular emotion should be felt. If these emotions are ​basic​ then there also may be a 
mind-independent answer available to help settle such disputes. In other words, basic emotions offer 
the prospect of securing a universal domain of cross-cultural human values. In order to see why such 
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objective standards exist, I need to say more about what senses of “basic” philosophers and 
psychologists have in mind when they speak of “basic emotions.”  
 
II. What’s basic about basic emotions?  
What are we saying when we say that an emotion is basic? In this section I briefly survey three possible 
answers to this question. Emotions might be basic in a developmental, compositional, or phylogenetic 
sense (Ortony & Turner 1990). Importantly, an emotion may be basic in all three senses. They are not 
mutually exclusive. Although it is a live question whether emotions are basic in any sense, in this 
section I argue that phylogenetically basic emotions hold the greatest promise for sentimentalist moral 
philosophers.  
To say that an emotion is developmentally basic is to say that the emotion appears early in the 
course of human development. That some emotions may be developmentally basic is not particularly 
debated among philosophers or psychologists. Prime candidates for developmentally basic “emotions” 
include positive and negative feeling states. These states define the valence of all experience. Although 
positive and negative feelings are an important part of lived experience, such states are too “thin” to 
serve the philosophically complex roles that moral emotions do.  They cannot ground moral 3
disagreement and lack the content to explain the differences between different kinds of moral 
assessments.  
To say that an emotion is compositionally basic is to say that these emotions work like atoms 
with respect to molecules. Compositionally basic emotions can be used to build other emotions and 
do not contain any other emotions as parts.  
3 To call an emotion “thin” is to say that it lacks evaluative content. To say that a state feels good (or bad) is not to 
say all that much about it. Contrast that with saying that one is disgusted by something. Disgust is “thicker” in that it 
not only tells us something about the ​valence ​of the feeling, it ​condemns ​its object.  
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The main criterion used by those who advocate basic emotions in the [compositional] sense 
focuses on the interrelationship of the emotions, rather than directly on the nature of the 
eliciting conditions. Here, an emotion is regarded as basic if it contains no other emotion as a 
component. (Ortony & Turner 1990, 324)  
 
Schadenfreude, for example, is the name given to a type of pleasure derived from the suffering of 
others. Schadenfreude is unlikely to be compositionally basic. It decomposes into several more 
primitive states: empathic pain derived from the suffering of others and pleasure caused by that 
experience. Many emotions might be thought to be compositionally basic though this form of 
basicness also will not be sufficient to serve the philosophically useful functions that philosophers 
appeal to basic emotions for. Compositionally basic emotions may vary widely across cultures and 
hence fail to account for disagreements.  
Lastly we can call an emotion basic in a phylogenetic sense. To call an emotion 
phylogenetically basic is to say something about the ​causal​ history of that emotion. A phylogenetically 
basic emotion arises as a product of natural selection. Psychologist Paul Ekman writes that 
[t]here are two key issues, which I use the adjective ​basic​ to convey about the position I have 
adopted… (1) There are a number of separate emotions which differ one from another in 
important ways. (2) Evolution played an important role in shaping both the unique and the 
common features which these emotions display as well as their current function. (Ekman 
1994, 170) 
 
Prime candidates for phylogenetically basic emotions include anger, disgust, fear, surprise, happiness, 
and sadness. A phylogenetically basic emotion is also likely compositionally basic in the sense that 
human cultures can expand upon their evolutionarily gifted repertoire of emotions to form more 
complex blends (transforming guilt into survivor’s-guilt, for example). That an emotion is 
phylogenetically basic therefore makes it a prime candidate for solving the problems of moral 
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disagreement and for making sense of Haidt’s cross-cultural moral dumbfounding research.  
This is because if phylogenetically basic emotions exist then all neurotypical humans will share 
these emotions. If all neurotypical humans share these emotions then they can serve as common points 
of contact for moral conversations about the function and purpose of these emotions. Additionally, 
because they are evolutionary products, there will be an answer to questions about what the 
appropriate objects are for these emotions. This would allow empirically-inclined philosophers to 
make progress on addressing difficult moral questions that are grounded on those emotions. For 
example, if shame evolved to serve a specific purpose then there may be a way to answer questions 
about whether it is appropriate to be ashamed of our appearance, class standing, or gender identities. It 
is little wonder that sentimentalist philosophers have tended to focus their attention on 
phylogenetically basic emotions (D’Arms & Jacobson 2000). In what follows, I use the term “basic 
emotion” to refer to phylogenetically basic emotions.  
 
III. Evidence for basic emotions 
What evidence do we have that emotions are basic? Charles Darwin theorized that animals (including 
human animals) behaved in relatively stereotyped ways when placed in specific sorts of circumstances 
(Darwin 1873/2009). Dogs will often adopt threatening or submissive body postures, for example, in 
order to establish a pack hierarchy. Humans will often flush and hide their faces when performing in 
socially costly ways. Emotions, he reasoned may have evolved as strategic solutions to universal life 
problems and his observations of stereotyped, seemingly automatic, behavior was evidence of this. In 
the wake of Darwin’s arguments, behavioral evidence dominated in the search for basic emotions.  
In this section, I survey this evidence. I focus predominantly on facial expression research that 
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has been emerging out of Paul Ekman’s research group for over four decades. I argue that, while 
Ekman’s research suggests that emotion and facial expression are connected, facial expressions do not 
give us evidence for basic emotion. Some have also looked to the body and the brain as a source of 
evidence for basic emotions. Although many have claimed to find evidence for emotionally distinct 
physiological or neurological profiles, I argue that meta-analyses of these studies provide, at best, 
evidence for a much weaker thesis than the existence of basic emotion. Evidence about a person’s face, 
body, and brain can give us useful information about the valence of their experience and about its 
intensity but no combination of these three pieces of information will tell us which particular emotion 
someone is experiencing. We will need to turn to other models of emotion to explain this result.  
In 1971, Paul Ekman and Wallace Friesen published a study on facial expressions that would 
create a new paradigm in emotion research (Ekman & Friesen 1971). Ekman and Friesen believed that 
facial expressions represented specific emotional states. In order to test this claim, Ekman and Friesen 
needed to determine whether people the world over agreed about what facial expressions meant.  
Ekman and Friesen chose the Fore people of Papua New Guinea as subjects. The Fore were 
chosen because they lived in small groups that were relatively isolated from Western cultural 
influences. Ekman and Friesen showed pictures of American subjects to members of the Fore. Given 
their isolation, the Fore were seen as excellent subjects to test Darwin’s supposition about the link 
between behavior, especially facial expression, and emotion. Each picture was a closely cropped image 
of a person’s face which Ekman and Friesen had taken great pains to pose. Each Fore was presented 
with one of three emotion words (translated from English into the Fore’s native language) and then 
asked which emotion the face in the image represented. If facial expressions gained their meaning a 
result of socio-historical facts then the Fore, who lacked knowledge of Western culture, should have 
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responded somewhat randomly when asked to match facial expressions to emotion words. This is not 
what Ekman and Friesen observed. The Fore converged on the same sorts of answers that their 
Western counterparts converged on. Smiling faces were connected to happiness, frowning faces with 
anger, and so on.  
Other researchers would quickly adopt Ekman and Friesen’s methodological approach and 
apply it across the globe (Ekman 1972b; Matsumoto 1992). The seemingly stunning convergence of 
the world’s peoples to questions about the meaning of facial expressions was interpreted as a powerful 
vindication of Darwin’s suggestion that emotions were basic. Ekman argued that basic emotions were 
what he called “affect programs.” Affect programs are mental modules. As such, they are 
non-conscious evolved neural circuits which produce stereotyped responses. Affect programs are 
triggered by specific emotionally relevant input and produce emotionally distinct outputs (Ekman 
1972a).  Each emotion, on this view, is distinguishable from others in virtue of the inputs and outputs 
associated with the it. Fear, for example, can be understood as a response to the perception of 
something as an imminent threat. When triggered, the fear module activates and prepares a creature to 
fight or flee the source of the threat. These preparations include emotion specific changes to a 
creature’s physiology (increased heart rate, blood pressure, and so on) and, in humans and other apes, 
includes the production of an emotion-specific facial expression. Although the facial expression 
research paradigm has been successfully replicated by researchers for decades, we should be wary of the 
conclusion that Ekman and others have drawn from it. In particular, I suggest that we jump too hastily 
from the convergence of facial expression judgment studies to claims about affect programs and basic 
emotion (Russell 1995). 
The affect program approach to emotion is grounded on several assumptions. First, the claim 
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that emotions evolved to produce specific facial expressions. Second, that humans evolved to detect 
these signals in order to better understand the emotional lives of those around us. Third, that these 
signals are difficult to convincingly fake. All three assumptions have been challenged in the last twenty 
five years. 
Facial expression judgment studies have been subject to many lines of criticism. One line of 
criticism takes issue with Ekman’s methodology, which most facial expression judgment studies 
adopted. Ekman’s paradigm utilized what is known as a within-subjects forced-choice design. 
Although, by itself, the use of any particular study design is neither helpful nor hurtful, 
methodological decisions can have an impact on we analyze the results of each study (Russell 2016). A 
“forced-choice” experiment is one in which subjects must select a response from those provided by the 
research. In the case of facial expression studies, critics point out that the forced-choice response 
format artificially raises the degree of convergence. The problem with using forced choice within 
subject experiments was perhaps best demonstrated in a series of studies in which, depending on the 
options available, subjects could be made to converge on different answers, even non-sense answers, 
when asked what a specific face expresses (DiGirolamo & Russell 2016).  
To say that an experiment is “within-subject” is to say that each subject of the experiment is 
exposed to the entire stimulus set (Russell 1995). In the context of facial expression studies, it means 
each subject is shown all of the facial expression photographs used in the experiment and asked to 
make judgments about them. Why might this pose a problem for judgment studies? Repeated 
exposure to several faces cues subjects to pay closer attention to the differences between faces and 
therefore impacts their judgments about the meaning of each face. This feature serves to artificially 
raise rates of convergence. Facial expression judgment studies that adopt “free-response” formats 
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(where subjects are asked to write in what they believe a face expresses) or “between-subject” designs 
(where subjects are only shown a single facial expression) show significantly lower rates of convergence 
than Ekman’s more traditional protocol. This is especially true for studies using members of 
non-Western cultures as subjects (Gendron, Roberson, van der Vyver, & Feldman Barrett 2014).  
Critics argue that these critical experiments show us that it is the study ​design​ utilized by most 
facial expression researchers that produces such high rates of convergence on answers. While these 
methodological criticisms do not rule out the existence of basic emotions, they weaken the kind of 
evidence that facial expression studies provide for them.  
A second set of criticisms levied against the facial expression paradigm targeted the assumption 
that basic emotions evolved to produce specific facial expressions as signals. In a study, conducted in 
the 1920s, psychologist Carney Landis tried to trigger strong emotional states in his subjects. Landis 
did this in various ways including asking subjects to place their hands into a bucket of frogs, smell 
ammonia, and view at pornographic images; at the end of the experiment, Landis asked his subjects to 
decapitate a living rat (Landis 1924). Throughout the experiment, Landis took photographs of his 
subject’s facial expressions. To his surprise, he found that subjects rarely produced the stereotyped 
facial expressions commonly associated with basic emotions. Although Landis’ approach has 
methodological (and ethical) issues of its own, Landis’ data would prompt other researchers to test the 
assumption that basic emotions evolved to produce specific facial expressions.  
Jose Fernández-Dols and his colleagues would attempt to test these assumptions in the late 
1990s. They were interested in the kinds of facial expressions people spontaneously made while 
undergoing strong emotional episodes. For example, they observed gold medal winners when they 
won their competitions, as they waited during the award ceremony, and during the moment they had 
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their medals placed around their necks (Fernández-Dols & Ruiz-Belda 1997). They also studied facial 
expressions generated spontaneously in a number of different public spaces including those of soccer 
fans during a match (Fernández-Dols & Crivelli 2013). If facial expressions evolved as non-cognitive 
(unconscious) signals of basic emotions, then soccer fans and gold medal winners seem like the perfect 
test subjects.  
Like Landis, Fernández-Dols’ results did not conform to the expectations of the facial 
expression paradigm. He discovered that, while subjects reported strong feelings throughout their gold 
medal experience, for example, that they only produced the expected facial expression when they were 
under public scrutiny. As the medal was placed on their necks, gold medal winners smiled. Smiles were 
missing, however, during other elements of their experience. Fernández-Dols and others argued that 
facial expressions were more likely to be the product of social signalling than of automatic affect 
programs. Attempts to discover the strength of the link between felt emotion and facial expression has 
consistently demonstrated that link to be weaker than predicted by affect program theorists 
(Reisenzein, Studtmann, & Horstmann 2013). Coupled with the methodological criticisms of the 
affect program paradigm, emotion researchers began to look for other avenues in support of basic 
emotions.  
Evidence from facial expression judgment studies, while initially seen as strongly supporting 
basic emotions, have received a critical second-look in the late 20th and early 21st centuries. Basis 
emotion theorists have, in the meantime, tried to look for other types of evidence to support their 
views. In particular, these researchers have held out hope that our bodies and brains will provide them 
with tell tale clues of basic emotion. If discrete emotions evolved to solve specific life conflicts, these 
emotions might be identifiable by the discrete patterns of physiological or neurological activation they 
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trigger. An explosion of studies emerged in the late 1990s and 2000s all claiming to have discovered 
emotion-specific markers for anxiety, anger, sadness, disgust, happiness, and the like. However, when 
subjected to meta-analysis, the strength and uniqueness of these emotion-specific markers falls 
dramatically (Phan, Wager, Taylor, & Liberzona 2002; ​Wager, Kang, Johnson, Nichols, Satpute, & 
Feldman Barrett 2015​).​ ​At the time of writing, intense disagreement exists about the robustness of 
emotion-specific physiological or neurological markers. 
Sentimentalist philosophers appealed to basic emotions in the hopes of addressing 
longstanding questions about the nature of moral judgments and moral disagreements. Basic emotions 
seemed poised to explain how moral disagreements, even radical ones, could be understood without 
appeal to moral relativism. However, in light of what has become a growing consensus away from 
basic emotions among psychologists, neuroscientists, and philosophers of mind, sentimentalists must 
look elsewhere for means of addressing these concerns. The picture of emotions emerging leans away 
from emotions as basic and toward a view of emotions as culturally informed perceptions.  
 
IV. Beyond Basic Emotions 
Although we have reason to doubt the existence of basic emotions, sentimentalist philosophers can 
salvage a great deal of useful material from the theories of emotion emerging in response to critiques of 
basic emotion. In addition, recent discoveries about the varying capacities all currently referred to as 
forms of empathy, especially as they appear in psychopaths and high functioning people with autism, 
not only give further evidence for the sentimentalist approach but can functionally replace basic 
emotions. That is, constructivist accounts of emotion can fulfill most of the roles that basic emotions 
were once thought uniquely suited perform. In this section I briefly survey contemporary 
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psychological constructivist and conceptual act theories of emotion. In the following, and final, 
section, I explain how psychopathic and autistic agency can point the way toward a more satisfactory 
moral psychology.  
If emotions are not basic, then what are they? How do we explain the seeming universality of 
emotional experiences and emotional facial expressions? Psychological constructivist approaches to 
emotion address these questions by distinguishing between “affect” and “emotion.” Affect, on this 
view is a phylogenetically basic aspect of all experience including non-emotional experiences. Affect 
defines the “feel” or “phenomenology” of experience and is defined in terms of valence 
(positive/negative) and arousal (high/low) (Feldman Barrett 2006). Hunger, for example, might 
include a highly arousing but negative affective component. Although emotions include affect as a 
component, emotions are meaningful groupings of causes, affective changes, thoughts, and behaviors 
that have been given their meaning as a result of cultural construction.  
Like the basic emotion approach, psychological constructionist models take evolution 
seriously and consider how biological and species-general factors have some role in the events 
that are conventionally named as ‘‘sadness’’, ‘‘anger’’, and ‘‘fear’’. Like the appraisal approach, 
the psychological construction approach to emotion involves making meaning out of sensory 
cues. And, like social constructionist models of emotion, psychological construction 
approaches consider the [culturally] specific elements of emotion. As socially constituted 
artifacts of learning and culture, no emotion category is assumed to be biologically basic. 
(Barrett 2009, 1290) 
 
Emotional concepts have top-down effects on affective experience. They structure how we understand 
the causes of affective change and the meaning of the change itself. Fago, song, and the like are a part of 
the emotional and social world for the Ifaluk. Emotional concepts structure and regulate how a person 
sees the world. In much the same way that we do not have to consciously make efforts to parse out our 
perceptions ​into​ cars, airplanes, computers, and the like, our emotional concepts structure our 
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affective experiences relatively automatically. Because emotional concepts must be learned (they are 
language and culture dependent), these approaches to emotion are comfortable abandoning the basic 
emotion paradigm.  
According to the conceptual act model, emotion categories exist because groups of people 
agreed (for phenomenological and social reasons) that this is a functional way to parse the 
on-going mental activity that is realised in the brain. The model is consistent with the 
observation that some of the categories are cross-culturally stable (because they function to 
address certain universal human concerns that stem from living in large, complex groups), 
whereas other categories are culture specific. The conceptual act model hypothesises that the 
category instances named with emotion words are real, but they derive their reality from the 
human mind (in the context of other human minds).  (Barrett 2009, 1293) 
 
Conceptual act theories allow for a great deal of variation in terms of how cultures parse out affective 
space into emotional and non-emotional experiences. For example, “[m]any depressed Chinese people 
do not report feeling sad, but rather express boredom, discomfort, feelings of inner pressure, and 
symptoms of pain, dizziness, and fatigue. These culturally coded symptoms may confound diagnosis 
among Chinese immigrants in the United States, many of whom find the diagnosis of depression 
morally unacceptable and experientially meaningless” (Kleinman 2004). Such findings are consistent 
with the conceptual act theory. 
I pause here to note that, on the conceptual act model of emotion, emotions are cultural 
artifacts. Sentimentalists interested in grounding moral values in emotion will therefore be driven to 
adopt a form of cultural relativism. Moralized emotional concepts will only make sense within those 
groups where such an emotion is available to structure affective experience. However, I argue that this 
acceptance has two upsides.  
First, at least some emotional concepts are likely to be pancultural in virtue of being useful for 
structuring social relations and managing the distribution of scarce resources. Shame may be such an 
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emotion (Wong & Tsai 2007). Insofar as moral regulative emotions like shame are cross-culturally 
shared, their lack of basicness does not pose a problem for cross-cultural moral communication. 
Second, conceptual act models make predictions about how individuals acquire and use emotionally 
laden moral concepts. In the next section, I argue that investigations of the moral concepts of 
psychopathic and high functioning persons with autism largely support these predictions and provide 
further insight into the nature of our moral capacities. 
 
V. Psychopathy, Autism, and Sentimentalist Moral Psychology 
Conceptual act theories of emotion include a basic element, affect, and a constructed element, 
emotion. Although affect is a complex phenomenon, some elements may be more important toward 
the acquisition of moral concepts than others. In particular, although psychopathy and autism are 
often characterized in terms of empathic deficits, I argue that these deficits are radically different from 
one another. High functioning people with autism appear capable of acquiring moral concepts while 
psychopaths cannot. An investigation into their empathic capacities will help us make sense of our 
underlying moral capacities.  
Psychopathy is a controversial name for a controversial diagnosis. In referring to psychopathy, 
I refer to the condition first identified by Hervey Cleckey in the 1940s and whose diagnostic criteria 
have been refined by Robert Hare and his psychopathy checklist (PCL-R). I do not simultaneously 
intend to refer to the diagnosis of Antisocial Personality Disorder (ASPD) in the 5th edition of the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (​American Psychiatric Association 2013; Hare, 
Hart, & Harpur 1991).​ Psychopathy, on this understanding, names a complex spectrum disorder 
diagnosed primarily in terms of character traits and emotional capacities. Because it is a spectrum 
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disorder, I limit my attention to a subclass of psychopaths referred to as successful psychopaths. 
Successful psychopaths score highly on the PCL-R but also lack other rationality-undermining 
comorbid illnesses (Babiak, Neumann, & Hare 2010).  
Psychopaths are said to lack an ability to feel empathic distress. Empathic distress occurs when 
we find ourselves immediately pained when we witness another person suffering. It is the name given 
to a particular form of empathy that is basic in all three senses of the term. It is developmentally basic 
in the sense that, for nearly all humans, empathic distress develops by around twenty four months. It is 
compositionally basic in the sense that empathic distress cannot be broken down into still more 
primitive experience. Lastly, because this capacity is found in many mammalian species, there is 
evidence that it is phylogenetically basic as well. Empathic distress is thought to be mediated by mirror 
neurons in somatosensory cortex that activate in response to our perception of the suffering of others 
(​Fecteau, Pascual-Leone, & Theoret 2008)​. In addition to lacking empathic distress, psychopaths are 
also characterized by personality traits including glibness, superficial charm, deceitfulness, and so on 
(Ramirez 2016). Although psychopaths are characterized in terms of an inability to feel empathic 
distress, successful psychopaths are often masters of another form of empathy: mindreading. This 
form of “[e]mpathy is the process by which one attains a cognitive grasp of, belief about, or knowledge 
of another's mental states” (Battaly 2011, 286). Mindreading empathy is an especially useful trait for 
the psychopath as it allows them to deceive and manipulate others by predicting their mental states. 
Autism is also a spectrum disorder. Autism, like psychopathy, is often characterized in terms of 
emotional deficits, empathic difficulty, and impairments in social function (McIntosh, 
Reichmann-Decker, Winkielman, & Wilbarger 2006).  Although both psychopathy and autism 4
4 Proponents of neurodiversity would, rightly, reject characterizations of autism that cast it as a mental illness or 
disorder (Ramirez 2016). For the purposes of my argument, I focus only on population-level differences between 
persons with autism, psychopaths, and neurotypical persons. I leave aside questions about whether autism is best 
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include empathic deficits, these deficits refer to different capacities. Where the psychopath lacks a 
capacity for empathic distress and excels at mindreading, the high functioning agent with autism has 
an intact capacity for empathic distress but struggles with basic mindreading abilities.  5
The empathic differences between high functioning persons with autism and psychopaths 
translate into differences in moral understanding and moral capacity. Psychopaths have difficulty 
distinguishing between what psychologists call moral norm violations and conventional norm 
violations. Although the distinction is controversial, norms of convention are thought to be 
authority-dependent, not based on harm, and limited in their context. For example, the norm for 
raising one’s hand before speaking is authority-dependent. If a speaker announces that her audience 
should feel free to ask questions without raising their hands, the rule no longer applies. When studying 
these distinctions, psychologists construe moral norms as authority-independent, serious, harm based, 
and universal.  Psychopaths tend to see all norms as norms of convention (Dolan and Fullam 2010). 6
Additionally, psychopaths lack the sort of moral motivation I referred to earlier when discussing the 
special nature of sincere moral judgments. Because they see all norms as mere norms of convention, 
moral norms lack special force.  
Most of us can easily note, for example, that there is a difference between how norms like ‘it is 
wrong to wear white after Labor Day’ and ‘it is wrong to steal a person’s identity.’ Whereas the powers 
viewed as a mental disorder or as an example of variation in human modes of cognizing the world.  
5 ​As with any spectrum disorder, generalities like these paint very broad strokes about the capacities that individuals 
have. Although some researchers have argued that persons with autism do in fact have a diminished capacity for 
empathic distress, in comparison with the deficits seen with psychopaths, the differences between high functioning 
persons with autism and neurotypical persons are less stark. For example, psychopaths have profoundly diminished 
myelination in areas thought to contain mirror neurons which might explain their pronounced lack of empathic 
distress (Ly, Motzkin, Philippi, Kirk, Newman, Kiehl, & Koenigs 2012). 
6 ​Although the moral/conventional distinction is controversial, I use it here to show that psychopaths inherit a kind 
of moral disability as a result of their lack of empathic distress (Greenspan 2003). I need not commit myself to the 
claim that the sense of “moral” defined by the moral/conventional task is essentially correct.  
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that be may change fashion norms, prohibitions against harming others non-consensually would 
continue to apply even if an authority figure claimed that they did not. The tendency to see moral 
norms as independent from authority runs so deep that many, including religiously orthodox 
communities, see moral norms as independent of god’s authority (Nucci & Turiel 1993).  
Children, including children with autism, begin to mark the moral/conventional distinction at 
a little over two years of age (Turiel 1977). Psychopaths, on the other hand, do not consistently or 
clearly note the difference. Although the moral concepts of individuals with autism can be structured 
differently from neurotypical moral concepts, their ability to mark the moral/conventional distinction 
and, especially, their desire to universalize the application of moral rules, makes clear that the moral 
concepts of persons with autism are full-blown moral concepts (McGeer 2008; Kennett 2002). The 
conceptual act theory of emotion can help to explain why persons with autism retain their capacity to 
form moral concepts and why psychopaths cannot. 
The conceptual act theory of emotion states that emotional concepts are acquired via cultural 
transmission. The primary vehicle for the cultural transmission of moral concepts is empathic 
contagion (Ramirez 2016). In particular, children with an intact capacity for empathic contagion will 
mimic the emotional expressions of those around them, learn to give specific patterns of emotional 
expressions names, and thereby develop emotional concepts that structure their adult affective 
experiences (Feldman Barrett 2006). Different cultures will structure their emotional concepts 
differently, according to their own needs, though some particular emotional concepts will prove 
cross-culturally useful.  
If moral concepts gain their meaning from emotional concepts, as sentimentalists claim, then 
empathic contagion plays an essential role in the acquisition of moral concepts. Because high 
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functioning persons with autism are capable of empathic distress, they will still be able to form moral 
concepts. Their issues with mindreading can make the application of these concepts difficult but their 
ability to note the distinction between purely authority-driven norms of convention and harm-based 
moral norms make it clear that they understand the moral domain as a distinct, affectively backed, 
domain (McGeer 2008).  
Psychopaths, on the other hand, lack the capacity to engage in empathic distress. They thus 
cannot acquire moral concepts using the traditional route. Their moralized concepts have the form of 
descriptive anthropological data. Their inability to feel pained by the harm they cause or to feel guilt as 
a result of violating moral wrongs can thus be traced back to their inability to form genuine moral 
concepts. This is just as the conceptual act theory of emotion predicts.   7
Sentimentalists interested in acquiring an empirically adequate picture of the nature of moral 
concepts and the structure of moral education ought to pay attention to the moral concepts of high 
functioning persons with autism and psychopaths. From these groups we learn that empathic 
contagion is the primary vehicle for the acquisition of moral concepts. Given the constructivist nature 
of the conceptual act theory, a sentimentalist constructivism emerges. Although this might appear to 
cut off the possibility of moral univocity, it does no such thing. Agricultural practices are fairly 
common, for example, and fairly stereotyped. The importance of crop rotation, irrigation, and other 
practices have been independently discovered several times in different cultures. Agriculture is not a 
basic human practice, however. Similarly, emotions are not basic in the senses mentioned earlier in this 
chapter (though our tendency to form emotional concepts may be). Some emotions may be so useful, 
however, that many cultures may construct emotions that all bear a family-resemblance to one 
7 Psychopaths are not entirely devoid of moral emotions. Psychopaths are capable of intense anger, for example and 
so-called “secondary” psychopaths appear capable of a degree of shame though this shame is often focused on 
failing to achieve the recognition that secondary psychopaths believe that they are owed (Morrison & Gilbert 2001).  
21 
another. Shame, for example, is an intensely social emotion and can track social relationships in highly 
complex ways. In cultures where such relationships are highly valued, an emotion very much like 
shame is likely to be found. Because at least some emotional concepts are useful to regulate human 
social interactions (shame and embarrassment being prime candidates), these emotions can still serve as 
a basis for explaining moral disagreements in a more limited fashion. To the degree that emotional 
concepts across cultures overlap with one another, then evaluative discourse about the values these 
emotions carve out is possible. Though less far-reaching than basic emotions, these emotions would 
permit cross-cultural moral engagement. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
Sentimentalist philosophers have turned to psychology and the neurosciences in the hopes of 
vindicating their intuition that moral concepts are grounded in our emotions. Though initially this 
empirical turn appeared to support the existence of basic emotion, these data have received significant 
criticism. In place of basic emotion, conceptual act theories have emerged to explain the seeming 
variation and universality of emotional experience. These views receive further support from the moral 
concepts of high functioning persons with autism and psychopaths. These groups provide strong 
evidence for the claim that empathic contagion is the primary vehicle for the acquisition of moral 
concepts. Because empathic contagion is basic, we should expect to see this capacity in all neurotypical 
human populations. Sentimentalists worried about the prospects of constructivism that emerges from 
conceptual act approaches can manage to explain many moral disagreements even without appeal to 
basic emotion.  
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